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Dieska: Teilhard De Chardin or Thomas Aquinas?

Teilhard De Chardin or
ThoIllas Aquinas?
by Joseph Dieska, Ph.D.
1. The Rise of Teilhardism
Eleven years have elapsed since Fr. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin died in a private
residence of his friends in New York, on April 10, 1955. Within this period of time,
many of his friends, religious writers, scientists, experts in the field of paleontology
and biology, official as well as self-appointed theologians, have written articles, papers, and over fifty monographs in French, English, German, and in other languages,
about his scientific work and his philosophical and theological views. One does not
have to delve too long into this comparatively numerous literature in order to discover that a legend has been created of a new prophet to whom "everything must
bow," as he himself has written in regard to evolution as "general condition" of
man's explanatory efforts.
The official authorities of the Roman Catholic Church, to which Fr. Teilhard
belonged, nave lSsueo a "'Monitum" warning all Diocesan Bishops, Superiors of
Religious Orders and SOCieties, and Presidents of Catholic Colleges and Universities
against "theological ambigUities and grave errors" found in the posthumously published works of Fr. Teilhard de Chardin. 1 But already before that official step of
the Holy Office in Rome was taken, it was known that none of Teilhard's works
could have been published because of the refusal of "Imprimatur" and "Nihil Obstat"
on the part of the Church and his Jesuit Order. Several distinguished members of the
Society of Jesus have expressed their negative criticism of Teilhard's theological views
while recognizing, at the same time, his SCientific contribution to paleontology and
prehistoric biology. To mention but few of them, the names of Frs. BOSCiO, S.J.,
Leopold Malevez, S.J., August Brenner, S.J., Jean Danielou, S.J., Henri de Lubac,
S. J. are familiar to the student of Teilhard de Chardin.
Not all the critics were able to rise above generalities and many of the critics
favorable to Chardin pointed to such issues that attracted the attention of the general public, while, at the same time, neglecting the most basic theological and metaphysical principles from which the whole of Christian doctrine in its Catholic
formulations springs, and upon which it hinges so fundamentally.
Catholic scholars have had an extraordinary opportunity to prove their theological and philosophical acumen, but many of them have failed to do so. They often
criticised the Monitum of the Holy Office, denied it, or even explained it in such a
way that no serious Catholic can accept it without encurring scorn. The name of
Teilhard has been used to remind the Catholic Church of her wrong dOings and the
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parallel is drawn between Teilhard and GaWeo, as well as that of other "martyrs"
of the scientific world "persecuted by the Church of Rome."
While using ambiguous passages from Fr. Teilhard's works, some Catholic
writers are questioning, and some are even ready to abandon many traditionally
accepted teachings of Catholic theological and philosophical thought, as for instance
monogenesis, the Fall of the first man, original sin, the existence of the angels, immutability of the dogma; and in the name of their philosophy of "proceSSion" they
endorse such contemporary fads as contraception, the dismissal of papal infallibility
and its transfer upon all the bishops of the Church, or even the merging of Catholic
faith into some sort of universal Christianity.
Pitiful as it is, some members of the higher hierarchy did not hesitate to raise
their voices even on the floor of the Second Vatican Council against so called "false
dualism" splitting reality into" material and spiritual," and they criticised the Scholastic theology and Thomistic philosophy on that account. Having in mind some
passages from the works of Teilhard referring to the impossibility of separating materiality from spirituality, they did not realize that they were touching upon the most
essential doctrines of Christian spiritualistic metaphysicS and revealed theology as
well. 2
Although Fr. Teilhard de Chardin was not a professional philosopher or theologian, and although he himself declared in his works no interest in metaphYSical
solutions and strictly philosophical problems, his posthumously published works
have substantially contributed to the intellectual climate of our day. The great number of his followers, the continuous re-editing of his books and the organizing of so
called "circles of Teilhard" testify that Fr. Teilhard has exercised a tremendously
powerful influence upon contemporary minds, and one must almost agree with
Thomas Molnar who has pointed very emphatically to this cultural phenomenon:
I do not mean to be frivolous. The fact that Teilhard is neither a
competent theologian, nor a scientist, but an enthusiast (in the Knoxian
sense), does not diminish his importance as a major source of pernicious
influence in this century. He cannot be dismissed, because in the short
decade since his death he has acqUired fanatical diSCiples who preach
his ungraspable 'Prometean vision' in magazines, in seminaries, and at
cocktail parties; and he has achieved this distinction because he has put
man's permanent Utopian aspirations into contemporary jargon. Later
ages will class him with the heresiarchs, Utopians, and other totalitarians, with the Gnostics, Pelagius, the Cathari, Rousseau and Karl Marx. 3
Another writer, Professor Peter B. Medawar, also writes in his criticism of The
Phenomenon ofMan:
It is a book Widely held to be of the utmost profundity and significance; it created something like a sensation upon its publication a
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few years ago in France, and some reviewers hereabouts have called it
the Book of the Year - one, the Book of the Century. Yet the greater
part of it, I shall show, is nonsense, tricked out by a variety of tedious
metaphysical conceits, and its author can be excused of dishonesty only
on the grounds that before deceiving others he has taken great pains to
deceive himself. 4
Such publiC statements have their practical consequences and they provoke a
sharp controversy between two main groups attacking one another. In the area of
philosophy and education, there are some who suggest that Catholic schools substitute Teilhardism for the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. In some Catholic colleges
and universities, espeCially in the United States, thi-s tendency is growing so strong
that the preSidents and deans of such schools favor among the members of the faculty those who declare themselves as followers of Teilhard against the followers of
Thomas Aquinas. The Monitum of the Holy Office, addressed directly to the presidents of Catholic schools, is not only not made known but also directly belittled in
its significance and the students are aSSigned readings, term papers from Th e Phenomenon of Man without being reminded of the errors and ambiguities mentioned
in the Monitum. The followers of Teilhard are invited as lecturers, guest speakers,
and the patron of the Catholic schools, St. Thomas, is publicly ridiculed by undergraduate students in local campus newspapers, while Teilhard is presented as the
hero of the day . According to these minds the Church is theoretically and practically
doomed to give up its old-fashioned stand on Thomism . Teilhard is the philosopher
of the present and Teilhardism the philosophy for the future.
And yet among the more responsible followers of Teilhard or even Thomas
Aquinas a much deeper meaning is sought for and felt in the works and teachings
of both of these men. May we be permitted to quote but one instance of such a serious understanding of the relationship between Thomistic philosophy and what may
be called Teilhardism today. Dr. Paul Chauchard, a recognized French phYSiologist
and professor at the Catholic Institute of PariS, writes in his book Science and Religion as follows:
To work today for the reconciliation of science and religion is, as
we shall see, to continue the great work of him whom the Church has
recognized as her own true philosopher, St. Thomas AqUinas. The agreement of his philosophy with modern scientific thought has been asserted,
and rightly so, by Fr. Sertillanges and by Remy Collin, and also by
Teilhard de Chardin: Transposed into a universe to which duration has
added a new dimension, the theory of matter and form become almost
indistinguishable from our present speculations about the development
of the natural world. 5
If this understanding and interpretation of Fr. Teilhard's efforts is correct, and
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we think it is as far as the basic philosophical principles mentioned by Chauchard
are concerned, then we think it futile to picture Teilhard as the antagonist of Thomas
Aquinas in that regard.
The followers of Teilhard, however, oppose Thomism and base their disagreement on the idea of evolution. They argue that Thomistic philosophy is not compatible with the new dynamic and evolutionistic outlook upon the world as discovered
by contemporary natural sdences, and they gratuitously assume that biological evolution is an absolute fact. The subsequent paragraphs of this paper will attempt to
show how false such a presumption is. 6

2. The "Metaphysical Evolutionism" of Teilhard de Chardin
The term "evolutionism" as used in this paper indicates the difference between a valid
but still only probable theory of evolution as defended by natural scientists and a
false philosophical assumption by which the phenomenon of evolution is substantiated. In order to make our own position on evolution completely clear, we distingUish three different types of evolution: (1) biological, (2) cosmic, (3) metaphysical.
It is the metaphysical evolution which, in our opinion, creates most difficulties in
Teilhard's writings in regard to their philosophical and theological problems.
There is a unanimous agreement among Catholic theologians today that Fr.
Teilhard's writings do contain ambiguities and doctrines contradictory to the traditional theological teachings of the Church. The testimony given to this effect most
recently by the Swiss theologian Cardinal Charles J ournet in connection with the
Teilhardian teaching about the "cosmic" nature of Christ is convincing, as well as
the general characterization of Teilhard's philosophic and theological temper and
method of writing by the newly elected head of the Jesuit Order, Fr. Aruppe, S. J.
Thus the indictment of the Holy Office of August 6, 1962, is being justified and the
books written on Teilhard after this document are less benevolent and more critical
in the theological sense than are publications prior to 1962.
Our interest, however, is more philosophical than theological. To put it briefly,
we cannot see how some of Teilhard's views, even if acceptable theologically, can be
reconciled with the metaphYSical positions defended by generally Christian philosophy.
One of such basic tenets is Teilhard's most general and unlimited conception of evolution as "universal condition" of every being and of every event that takes place
in the universe considered "phenomenologically." This unrestricted application of
the so called time-dimension to everything is expressed by Fr. Teilhard in his The
Phenomenon of Man and it is being repeated with equal emphaSiS in many other
places in his books. Thus we read in The Phenomenon of Man:
For many, evolution is still only transformism, and transformism
is only an old Darwinian hypotheSiS as local and as dated as Laplace's
conception of the solar system or Wegener's Theory of Continental Drift.
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Blind indeed are those who do not see the sweep of a movement whose
orbit infinitely transcends the natural sciences and has successively invaded and conquered the surrounding territory - chemistry, physics,
sOciology and even mathematics and the history of religions. One after
the other all the fields of human knowledge have been shaken and carried away by the same under-water current in the direction of the study
of some development. Is evolution a theory, a system or a hypothesis?
It is much more: it is a general condition to which all theories, all hypotheses, all systems must bow and which they must satisfy henceforward if they are to be thinkable and true. Evolution is a light illuminating
all facts, a curve that all lines must follow. 7
Now, if we read carefully every word in the foregoing passage, we must see
Teilhard's understanding of evolution not only in its biological or cosmic sense but
undeniably also in its metaphysical significance. He speaks expliCitly of" general
condition," "all the fields of human knowledge," "all facts," "a curve that all lines
must follow." Considered by a philosopher and not exclusively by a Teilhardian
"phenomenologist," as Dr. Paul Chauchard and perhaps others suggest, such a
formulation of evolution can mean only one thing, i.e., the Heraclitean "universal
flux" (P ANT ARE IN) or Bergsonian elan vital Is there any logical distinction
or metaphysical difference between these three exaggerated statements on universality
of evolution as the truly ontological and metaphysical character of being? We do not
think so . Teilhard expresses in his works the same idea that can be found in a very
detailed metaphysically elaborated way in the works of his philosophical teacher,
Henry Bergson. And as Henry Bergson declared his "vital energy" to be the only
metaphysical substratum of being, so Teilhard speaks with equal conviction of the
"tangential" and "radial energy" as the two forms of evolving reality tending toward
the point "Omega," at once immanent and transcendent, and identified with God and
with Christ as the "center of evolution."
The student of Teilhard sees clearly that the formulations given by Teilhard in
regard to evolutionary character of cosmic phenomena do not differ from metaphysical speculations of Henry Bergson. And this resemblance between Bergson and Teilhard is noticeable also in their philosophical speculations about God. The pantheistic
conception with Bergson is not identical with that pantheism which Fr. Teilhard defends in his writings, but there are very frequently repeated statements in Teilhard's
works that remind the reader of the formulations used by Bergson. We cannot go
into this difficult question here, and therefore we are interested in this problem only
inasmuch as it helps us to see the metaphysical character of the Teilhardian concept
of evolution. It cannot be denied that Teilhard's eagerness to speak of reality as
something which is a continuous evolution, process, flow, as something which is the
"becoming" rather than "being" brings him as close to Bergson's metaphysical evolutionism as it is possible.
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Our intent here is to prove that Teilhard is a defender of metaphysical evolutionism and not only a defender of biological or cosmic evolution as acceptable
scientific theory. This same point can be proven from Teilhard's insistence on the
dismissal of "static essences" as well as from his sharp criticism of "fixism," "immobilism" of which he accuses the traditional philosophies, sciences and even theologies. His denial of essences, and his understanding of classical essences as
something necessarily static and anti-dynamic, 8 proves that he not only was not a
well trained metaphysician but also that he did not want to accept the idea that something that transcends the "general condition" of evolution could exist.
Thus we read in a letter written by Teilhard on May 18, 1954:
You are, quite rightly, concerned with the question of 'essences.'
But you must realize that since we have now to advance from a 'metaphysic of the cosmos' to a 'metaphysic of cosmogenesis,' the question is
not exactly how to preserve but how to transpose (into an additional
dimension) the notion of the fixity of essences.
In cosmogenesis, essence becomes genesis: so that what is fixed is
direction - this constant direction being accompanied by an accentuation of certain characteristics and operating through certain steps or
thresholds (separating domains that are essentially different: for example, the pre-living and the living, the simply living and the reflectively
living-physics in full of such' steps '). 9
Teilhard apparently did not share the Aristotelian ontological principle that
being is not the result or consequence of becoming but its prerequisite. Aristotle could
not understand how becoming could become without first being something which becomes something else. In his ontology, that was not static at all, he demanded that
everything that becomes, always becomes something else. It cannot be nothing becoming something, because nothing, not having existence, cannot become anything.
Thus, if we dismiss the actuality of existing being and substitute for it the category
of "process" or "becoming," our intellect still demands that that which is "in a process" must first possess its actuality. Professor Jacques Maritain pointed to this illogical thinking in Bergson's philosophy of "eternal change" by shOWing how Bergson
dismissed all substances and thus was forced to declare "change" or "process" to
be the only substance. 10
This logical predicament is present with every form of metaphysical evolutionism which denies every form of immutability. Teilhard fell in the same difficulties.
This difficulty cannot be solved by resorting to any phenomenological methodology
by which the logical laws, followed by our abstractive intellect, cannot be invalidated.
Thus the metaphysical evolutionism must be considered logically as well as metaphYSically false. In Christian philosophy and theology, the source of every being is
the immutable, not evolving, God. This Unchangeable Principle must be exempt from
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the general condition of evolution. The metaphysic that does not allow for this fact
cannot explain evolution at all, because in that case it would have to violate the most
fundamental logical principle of contradiction. It would have to assert the fact of
" self-evolution" which would mean that something evolves itself from itself and by
itself.
However, we must not fail to mention that Fr. Teilhard, being a Catholic scientist and a priest, was fully aware of the complications that necessarily followed
from his careless and exaggerated formulation of the universality of evolution as the
explanatory principle. Hence spring many of his theological and eschatological ambiguities with which his works are swarming. We must not overlook this important
aspect of Teilhard 's views even if we are perhaps emotionally attracted by his personality and by many other positive qualities of his scientific and theological thought.
In view of this evolutionistic understanding of reality it will be useful to point
out at least in a very concise way some consequences which Teilhard's metaphysical
evolutionism cannot avoid in particular areas of philosophy, theology and other
sciences.
Thus it was known by the old Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, that if everything were but " an eternal flux, " then our knowledge would be
impossible and we would have no immutable basis for truth which is indispensable
for the biological and ethical survival of mankind. It is a truism to emphasize that
no Christian philosopher has ever approved or satisfied himself with what is known
as the epistemological scepticism, subjectivism and relativism. In other words, the
existence and possibility of immutable and absolute truths is one of the basic principles of Christian philosophy. Yet Teilhard's evolutionistic thinking excludes such interpretation of truth completely. Some of Teilhard's followers attempted to solve the
difficulty by changing the notion of truth. However, such an attempt is rather an
evasion than solution of the problem. Whether we define truths as conformities between reality and mind or between various changeable relations, the fact remains that
the absoluteness of our certitude of knowledge evaporates as soon as we deny that
immutable element upon which it rests. ll
This objection against evolutionistic epistemologies was raised by Mgr. Bruno
de Solages as he wrote:

If everything in the universe evolves, if the Universe itself has a
geneSiS, a development, a history, the thought of men is also carried
along in this current; we write the history of cultures, the history of
philosophies, the history of religions, the history of theology, the history of dogmas . But does that mean that everything changes and that
there is no immutable truth, no stable and transcendent values? Well,
yes - there you have the real problem for Christian thought, how to
maintain, in the midst of this general evolution, transcendent values
and realities. Hic labor, hic OpUS. 12
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We have mentioned already that Teilhard's views on universal nature of evolution complicate his personal stand on some of the traditional theological teachings
and articles of Catholic faith. Thus the critics of Teilhard find it difficult, at times,
to determine the proper meaning of his statements. The question of the transcendence
and immanence of God is debated, God's immutability is not explicitly stressed, the
creation of human soul is not treated clearly, the fact of original sin as understood
by Christian theology and Revelation is interpreted by Teilhard in such a way as
to be reconciled with the biological theory of polygenism. The existence of evil and
its origin, the meaning of sin as well as the fact of free will in the universal process
of man 's spiritual evolution, are presented in a very ambiguous way, and it is often
almost evident that Teilhard's views are rather deviations from Christian theological
thought than its improvement. Theologians agree that Teilhard tried to find some
sort of synthesis between revealed eschatology and so called Johannine and Pauline
Christology and his own evolutionistic theories. However, it is equally emphasized
that no individual theologian must assume the right to defend theories that are not
approved by the teaching authority of the Church.
It would lead us too far afield if we wished to clarify such theological questions
in more thorough manner. Let it be but stated briefly that all those who, because of
their incomplete knowledge of all Teilhard's views, simplify the difficulties and suggest to substitute Teilhard for Thomism, do not realize that such a suggestion is not
practical at all. We have mentioned already that Teilhard was not a systematic philosopher. He did not elaborate an independent system in any specific area of philosophy. Most of his views were taken from his Catholic Thomistic training for the
priesthood. Dr. Paul Chauchard, who seems to follow Teilhard in many points, views
this fact as fundamental for our proper understanding and evaluation of Teilhard's
doctrines. He defends him against those who interpret Teilhard's teachings as contrary to Catholic dogma. However, it is our impression that Dr. Chauchard does it
on his own. He reads into Teilhard the meaning which is more acceptable to Catholic
faith and to theological tradition. The fact remains that Teilhard himself abstained
from more explicit elaborations of certain doctrines and created ambiguities and misunderstandings. In this sense we must side with Fr. Philipe De la Trinite' who in his
book Rome and Teilhard de Chardin pOints out doctrines held by Teilhard and opposed to the Catholic position. Dr. Chauchard's effort to reconcile Teilhard's scientific
phenomenology with Thomistic philosophy, no matter how plaUSible, must still be
considered as the task which Teilhard himself did not accomplish to the satisfaction
of either Thomism or contemporary scientific thought.
Being fully aware of the accomplishments Thomistic philosophy has achieved
in the realm of metaphysics, Dr. Chauchard is forgetting that empirical sciences and
Teilhardian "scientific phenomenology," as will be shown in the last section of this
paper, have very little to offer to the improvement of our metaphysical views. Since
metaphysics built by the philosopher takes its strength from rational self-evident prinCiples, scientific phenomenology, as Dr. Chauchard emphasizes on several occasions,
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cannot transcend the limitations of materiality and must necessarily remain within
the domain of certain scientific cosmology and natural philosophy. No natural scientist and for that same reason no scientific phenomenologist must claim the exclusive right to prescribe for us the norms of ethics, nor demand a revision of theology
from theologians. It will remain the eternal duty of metaphysics, as Etienne Gilson
put it, to check natural sciences and to decide upon their final epistemological validity and logical correctness. 13
We read the sympathetic suggestions of Dr. Chauchard with deep sincerity and
good will; however, their practical significance seems to be diminished by the admission that Teilhard himself was not and did not intend to be a metaphysician.
Scientific phenomenology takes its stand at the level of the immanent which has its own special inner coherence. At this level, it verifies
emergence. That is to say, the spiritual, ever immanent in the unity of
being, complies more and more with some gUiding force, and that the
emergence of the whole, in relation to its parts, already denotes some
degree of transcendence. But only metaphysics can give us the transcendent in its complete splendor at both the human and the divine levels,
and explain the whole meaning of integration as the principle of new
forms. 14
What then would we teach in Catholic schools under the title of Teilhardism?
Would not it be only Teilhard's metaphysical evolutionism? Or maybe we could find
something to improve our theological views about Christ, His three natures, His
evolutionary character, His pantheistic existence as matter-spirit-process leading the
entire universe toward "the point Omega." But do not such topiCS belong more to
supernatural theology than to rational philosophy? Those are the difficulties we see
in introdUcing Teilhardism into our Catholic classrooms.
But the objection is often raised tllat Teilhard has reconciled our theological
truths with contemporary sciences more adequately than Thomism did or could.
We shall discuss this view in the following paragraphs.

3. Teilhard's Method of SCientific "Phenomenology"
One of the merits stressed very emphatically by those who evaluate Fr. Teilhard's
writings and views favorably is his effort to reconcile Christian theological truths with
contemporary scientific outlook. The question must be raised-what science and what
scientific outlook are meant? A positivistic concept of science differs from what we
suggest to call a realistic understanding of science. We believe that no Christian scientist can accept a positivistic philosophy of science. For him the terms" experience"
and "empirical method" cannot be exhausted by the reduction of observable phenomena to the "Kontrolsatze" and "Protokolsatze" of the Logical-Positivistic "verification" as suggested by the notorious Vienna School philosophers. For that reason
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we recommend a clearer language and terminology whenever the expression science
and scientific are employed.
Fr. Teilhard's method is called by himself and by his followers phenomenology.
This term has nothing in common with the contemporary movement of Phenomenology originated by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl. Neither is Teilhard's
notion of phenomenology related to Kant 's epistemological phenomenalism as such.
Phenomenology, according to Teilhard, is the method every scientist must use and
follow if he wishes to avoid all metaphysical presuppositions and consequences of
empirically observable facts. It is a method that works in the concrete and that adds
to the classical dimensions (spatial dimensions) the dimension of time or evolution.
Thus, according to Teilhard, every phenomenon studied by the scientists must be
understood and considered not only in its presently existing form but also in its longlasting geneology or evolutionary character. It must be studied as a long-lasting
" process" and not as a "static," "immobile" or "fixed" being.
In essence, the change wrought in our experience by the appearance
of what we shall soon call space-time is this, that everything that up to
then we regarded and treated as points in our cosmological constructions
became instantaneous sections of indefinite temporal fibres. To our opened
eyes each element of things is henceforth extended backwards ... as far
as the eye can see in such a way that the entire spatial immensity is no
more than a section 'at the time t' of a trunk whose roots plunge down
into the abyss of an unfathomable past, and whose branches rise up
somewhere to a future that, at first sight, has no limit. In this new perspective the world appears like a mass in process of transformation. 15

It is unfortunate that Fr. Teilhard places his belief in an absolute validity of
the dimension of evolution before every empirically observed and observable phenomenon. He forgets that evolution as scientific theory or hypotheSiS is of purely
mental origin; it is the conclusion we draw by our thinking from the empirically
observable phenomena such as anatomic resemblance of fossilized bodies of various
creatures, geological affinity between various forms of life, and the ascendence of the
organic creatures towards ever higher and higher level of life. All such phenomena
can be observed by our scientific methods. However evolution itself will always remain only our conclusion from such facts.
In view of the foregoing remark it is necessary to exercise an extremely vigilant
soberness while reading Fr. Teilhard's enthusiastic statements on evolutionary character of everything that can be studied by empirical methods and techniques. Being
trained in natural sciences more than in abstract metaphYSical and generally philosophical methodology, Fr. Teilhard did not see the inevitable difficulties that follow
from the application of such strictly empirical procedures to the problems of pure
metaphysics, ethiCS, and theology. Whenever he speaks in his works of the evasion
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of any metaphysical and generally philosophic approaches, he does not realize that
whatever may be left of his phenomenology often is of no use for the solutions of the
problems reaching beyond sensorily observable facts of the empirical world.
Even when he speaks of the nature of man, of his origin and his final goal
which is the reaching of the "point Omega," Teilhard is influenced mainly by his
biological thinking. While analyzing the future of man and of the universe, he resorts to terms and metaphors that are applicable to biology but not to the supernatural order of God, grace and other mysteries of faith . In the area of pure metaphysics,
Teilhard follows the pattern of many other evolutionists (Hegel, Marx, Spencer, Lossky,
Bergson, Dewey) whose general frame of mind is that they do not distinguish between
a change, process, or evolution and the causes by which such ph e nom e n a are
brought about. They dismiss substances of individual things in the long-lasting or
continuously evolving process, yet, as Professor Jacques Maritain puts it, they declare " change" itself to be the only true substance. According to such evolutionistic
philosophers there are no immutable substances, but there must be the substance of
" process." If this way of expressing the idea of evolutionism is not an open contradiction, then it is completely unintelligible and thus outside the realm of the logician
or any rationally philosophizing thinker.
Fr. Teilhard, it seems to us, has caught his almost unlimited enthusiasm for
evolution from Henry Bergson, and applied it, along with his good friend Professor
Edouard I.e Roy, to his own religious views as well as to his eschatological visions
and intuitions. 16 For this reason Teilhardism can go in no other direction than that
which ends with the consequences follOWing necessarily from Bergsonian intuitionistic
and irrationalistic principles.
We must emphasize that none of the three kinds of evolution distinguished in
this paper ( biological, cosmic, metaphysical) are logically and metaphysically accreditable with the term, a fact. An empirical scientist accepts them not in the sense
of absolute truth, but only within the context of the whole of his scientific theorems,
knOWing that everything natural sciences work with, discover, or prove, can never
transcend hypothetical certitude or probability. Fr. Teilhard, on the contrary, tells
us that every SCientific investigation, description or interpretation must be based on
the evolutionistic principle to which there is no exception. For this reason we must
reject his method of phenomenology and declare it as unscientific and entirely arbitrary if employed to the phenomena reaching beyond sensory, material world. Teilhard 's most serious error in regard to general methodology is that he neglected to
apply a thorough epistemological criticism to his basic phenomenological principles.
One does not have to agree with the philosophy of science of Logical Positivism to
realize the limitations of natural sciences and the unique function of metaphysical
knowledge in the investigating processes of any philosopher or scientist. It is because
of this lack of training in metaphysics that Teilhard deceived himself into thinking
that he could offer a more acceptable, truer and more convincing picture of the phenomenon of man than any traditional metaphysician. Teilhard failed to see that with-
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out metaphysics no empirical science can penetrate the true nature of any being and
that whatever it says about any phenomenon is only an incomplete, superficial, and
imperfect description. 17
However, the reader of these lines could oppose our criticism of Fr. Teilhard
by pointing to many passages in Teilhard's works in which he states that his interest
is not metaphysical, ontological or even theological. We are fully aware of this fact.
Yet in spite of such explicit declarations Fr. Teilhard did not keep his promise nor
did he follow his phenomenological resolutions faithfully. He did develop his eschatology, Christology, his evolutionistic metaphysics and also partly his philosophy of
history to such an extent that some of his reviewers see exactly in this area of his
views the most significant contribution to our contemporary intellectual outlook.
Thus, as Fr. Paul Bernard Grenet, an outstanding French theologian and Thomist
philosopher, has pointed out, Fr. Teilhard has become "the philosopher in spite of
himself' (Ie philosophe malgre'lui)' 18
It is, therefore, almost unbelievable that so many contemporary scholars have
overlooked such an essential defect in Teilhard's posthumously published works. With
the exception of some well trained theologians and philosophers, and with equally
precious exception of such well known scientists as Dr. Maurice Vernet, a French
biologist and phySiologist, or Professor Peter B. Medawar, biologist and the Nobelprize winner for 1960, a great portion of the writings on Teilhard is marked with a
tendency to excuse him, to make his errors less serious, and, what is absolutely
contrary to the spirit and nature of a true scholarship, many scholars are still willing to continue their praises of Teilhard and to spin a legend of his tremendous contribution to the contemporary revival of the religious feelings among Catholic as
well as non-Catholic believers.
It is not our intent to evaluate Fr. Teilhard's personal profile, his religiOUS
and priestly character as well as his relationship to the Church. We are aware of
the fact that he never refused to submit his will to his superiors and always took
their orders or advice seriously. It is also known that he often insisted on one's
own convictions even if they were at the moment unacceptable. From his early years
during the period of World War One, he used to speak of his views as those that
would conquer the Church in the future. This chapter of Teilhard's significance is
still to be written by someone in the future. Our main purpose in this informative
study is to cast some light on the basic aspects of Teilhard 's teachings in connection
with his methodological orientation as a biologist and paleontologiSt. Therefore, we
are here interested in his ideas and views more than in his personality.
In view of this distinction, we must emphasize that no matter how sincere Fr.
Teilhard's intentions might have been, no matter how much fervent apostolic zeal
could have kindled the fire of love in his priestly heart, the objective truth is that
many of his views expressed in the works so far published are not only theologically ambiguous and erroneous, but, due to his false method, they are completely
void of any validity and they must be treated as completely personal, arbitrary, and
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subjective visions or intuitions. No official theologian can accept them as equivalent
to the theological teachings presented by the Church and its teaching magisterium.
The same attitude must be held in philosophy, in particular, the Christian philosophy
whose basic principles cannot be opposed to the divinely revealed truths. And it does
not serve the cause of science or religion to gloss over Fr. Teilhard's flaws by taking refuge in terms like vision, intuition, supernatural glf~ mystic, mysticism, pTOphe~
etc. All such attempts must be condemned from the point of view of a strictly scientific methodology of which Fr. Teilhard showed but a very limited knowledge.
Our criticism in regard to the scientific methodology of Fr. Teilhard can be
supported by the statements of those natural scientists who have been recognized as
true experts in their field. Thus Professor Medawar, criticizing The Phenomenon of
Man, has written:
I have read and studied The Phenomenon of Man with real distress, even with despair. Instead of wringing our hands over the Human
Predicament, we should attend to those parts of it which are wholly
remediable, above all to the gullibility which makes it possible for people to be taken in by such a bag of tricks as this. If it were an innocent,
passive gullibility, it would be excusable; but all too clearly, alas, it is
an active willingness to be deceived. 19
Equally sharp is the criticism expressed by Dr. Maurice Vernet, a noted French
physiologist and expert in the problems of life, who has written in the Introduction
to his book The Great Illusion of Teilhard de Chardin the following negative evaluation:
In the first place, we wish to show the fundamental errors that have
created an illusion, at first very seductive, of the whole system of a universal transformism of Teilhard, and to demonstrate to what incoherent
conclusions such errors lead on the philosophical level, in particular,
in questions such as freedom, individual responsibility, the eminent and
inalienable place of person, as well as the problems of evil, of human
destiny, and finally, the problem of individual soul . ..
Although Teilhard de Chardin ends up with an idea of religious
character, he starts from a conception of the origin of life, which conception is little conformable to the scientific data and which no one can
verify: that is the hypothesiS of a progreSSive evolution through successive transformations issuing from matter to man and passing through
the realm of animals; a hypotheSiS of consciousness which comes to
existence only in the course of such evolution . . .
Thus, it seems that, considered in the light of general phySiology,
these all are manifest errors. In Teilhard's edifice, everything becomes
fragile in spite of its apparent solidity.20
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There is also another error in Fr. Teilhard's method which must be criticized
most sharply. It has been known under an appropriate name of scientism. In the
case of Teilhard we could speak even more fittingly of a certain biologism introduced
into the field of metaphysics, theology and eschatology.
Thus, if a scientist, working in a certain domain of phenomena, transfers his
spedfic method to a completely different area of problems, he will never achieve dependable results. This is true, most of all, in regard to metat>hysics, ethics and theology. It has been repeatedly asserted, in particular, by the followers of Teilhard,
that the traditional Aristotelico-Thomistic metaphysics was built upon the ancient
Ptolemaic cosmology. This nonsense can be believed only by those who have never
grasped or penetrated the essence of Aristotelian metaphysics and its strictly rational,
logical foundations. Metaphysics, being a science of being as such, were it built on
cosmology, could never transcend the realm of materiality and thus it would be forever doomed to remain within the frame of a kind of Natu rphilosophie or philosophy of nature. We must not forget that for Aristotle, as well as for St. Thomas,
the word exp erience was not synonymous with the " experience" of the English empiricists. In their sensualistic theory of knowledge, philosophers like John Locke,
George Berkley, David Hume, John S. Mill, etc., did not believe in the intellectual
grasp of the first logical principles and relations among the sensorily perceivable
phenomena. For them metaphysics was based on the knowledge proVided exclUSively
by the senses. For Aristotle and the Thomistic epistemology, sensory knowledge was
only the starting point and beginning. The senses represent only the starting pOint,
while the essence and termination of knowledge lies in the intellect. The human intellect, capable of infallible and immediate grasp of certain self-evident prinCiples,
discovers new truths, relations, and facts. It is on this intellectual grasp that Aristotle
has built his metaphysics in the first place, and only from this purely rational basis
could his general ontology, cosmology and natural theology receive their metaphysical validity.
The followers of Teilhard, ignoring such elementary facts from the history of
philosophy, involve themselves in polemics with the traditional philosophical teachings, and they propose to reject the " static" concepts of the traditional metaphysics
just because such concepts do not fit in their evolutionistic understanding of reality.
The new evolutionistic metaphysics, according to which there is no immutable
being, no unchangeable " essences," and according to which everything is a continuous flux or process, is based on the belief that biological species developed from one
another by the long process of evolution. Teilhard 's hypotheSiS of universal evolution, changed into a metaphysical prinCiple, has been applied to non-biological phenomena as well as to the supernatural order where the mysteries of the Christian
faith, such as Creation, Incarnation, Redemption are being described in a completely
biological way . This is what we call Teilhard 's biologism and qualify it as totally
unsuitable for theology or general metaphysics.
To illustrate this point we may introduce Teilhard 's description of the Second
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Divine Person, Jesus Christ as the spear-head of evolution, as the cosmic evolution
itself, as the Center of the evolutionary "Spirit-Matter-Process leading the whole Universe toward the point, Omega."
As early as in St. Paul and St. John we read that to c reate, to fulfill and to purify the world is, for God, to unify it by uniting it organically with himself. How does he unify it? By partially immersing himself
in things, by becoming 'element,' and then, from this point of vantage
in the heart of matter, assuming the control and leadership of what we
now call evolution. Christ, principle of universal vitality because sprung
up as man among men, put himself in the position (maintained ever
since) to subdue under himself, to purify, to direct and superanimate
the general ascent of consciousness into which he inserted himself. By a
perennial act of communion and sublimation, he aggregates to himself
the total psychism of the earth. And when he has gathered everything
together and transformed everything, he will close in upon himself and
his conquests, thereby rejoining, in a final gesture, the divine focus he
has never left. Then, as St. Paul tells us, God shall be all in all ...
God, the Centre of centres. In that final vision the Christian dogma
culminates. And so exactly, so perfectly does this coincide with the Omega
Point that doubtless I should never have ventured to envisage the latter
or formulate the hypothesis rationally if, in my consciousness as a believer, I had not found not only its speculative model but also its living
reality. 21
And again when he speaks of the application of his theory of evolution to the
Christian religion, Teilhard writes;
Though frightened for a moment by evolution, the Christian now
perceives that what it offers him is nothing but a magnificent means of
feeling more at one with God and of giving himself more to him .. . In
a spiritually converging world this ' Christic' energy acquires an urgency
and intensity of another order altogether. If the world is convergent and
if Christ occupies its centre, then the Christogenesis of St. Paul and St.
John is nothing else and nothing less than the extension, both awaited
and unhoped for, of that noogenesis in which cosmogenesis - as regards
our experience - culminates. Christ invests himself organically with the
very majesty of his creation. And it is in no way metaphorical to say
that man finds himself capable of experiencing and discovering his God
in the whole length, breadth and depth of the world in movement ...
Evolution has come to infuse new blood, so to speak, into the perspectives and aspirations of Christianity. In return, is not the Christian faith
deStined, is it not preparing, to save and even to take the place of evolution? 22
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If biologism, which is a procedure of hypothesis, is accepted in theology, then
all absolute truth, all real certitude, all true knowledge - everything would be reduced to a hypothetical status. To admit or accept such a method in natural sciences is sometimes necessary, because the absolute certitude of our experimental
knowledge is excluded. However, to accept such a method as the only valid, or the
only scientific and general method for all fields of knowledge, would mean to abandon the most fundamental criterion of certitude. As to metaphysics, such a procedure
would mean the acceptance of scepticism in epistemology and the reduction of metaphysics or general ontology to cosmology, and that would lead finally to the rejection
of the most essential characteristics of Christian philosophy.
Thus, in concluding our criticism and analysis of Teilhard 's phenomenological
method, we may sum up:
Fr. Teilhard tried to achieve something which is in itself impossible. On the
one hand, while avoiding metaphysical penetration of the problems involved, he
promised to give a more dependable " vision" or scientific picture of man, universe,
and God. Resting his views upon a certain biologism he believed that traditional
doctrines of Christian faith had to be reexamined and reinterpreted in a new light of
evolutionism. Furthermore, he wanted to convince his followers of a greater validity
of such views because they were built upon a method known as "scientific," used in
natural sciences, in particular, in biology.
On the other hand, while abandoning the ground of empirically observable phenomena and plunging himself into theological, eschatological and purely metaphysical
problems, he failed to achieve a truly consistent and solid" synthesis" or reconciliation between science and religion. His phenomenological method did not allow him
to prove anything that would be of permanent value in metaphysics and theology.
Therefore he had to confess his own defeat by admitting that most of his views were
strictly personal intuitions and mystical visions. Without metaphysics, we have stated,
no natural scientist can bring about a solid and consistent synthesis between science
and theology or faith. Teilhard seemed to be aware of his difficulties whenever he
realized that he was not understood by his closest friends. In this sense he wrote to
his cousin Marguerite Teilhard-Chambon (Claude Aragonn'es) in a letter of 21st
August, 1919:
While reaching a more precise definition of my points of contact
with my friends, I have also come to realize the turn of my mind that
divides me from them. I'm less concerned than they are with the metaphysical side of things ... I realize that, to the very marrow of my
bones, I'm sensitive to the real, to what is made of it ... This bias
means that I'll always be a philistine to the profeSSional philosophers: ... 23
Thus, because Fr. Teilhard felt within himself a lack of metaphysical bent, he
could not have achieved that syntheSiS between his scientific position and his religiOUS
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beliefs that we find with Thomas Aquinas who, besides being a great theologian,
was also an outstanding metaphysician, and thus could have accomplished his synthesis between the sciences of his time and Christian faith.
The present day controversy about Teilhard and Teilhardism, the attitude of
the Holy Office in Rome, and the most recent agreement among Catholic theologians
in regard to theological ambiguities and errors found in Teilhard's works must not
be overlooked whenever we consider his positive or negative impact upon contemporary thought.
FOOTNOTES
The Monitum of the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office was officially published in AAS, August
6, 1962, p. 526. Its full text in our English translation from the Latin original is the following:
Some works of Fr. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (among which are also those published
posthumously) are being propagated and are enjoying a favorable acceptance.
Abstaining from passing judgment on points pertaining to the positive sdences, it is evi·
dent enough that the works just singled out are swarming with such ambigUities in regard to
philosophical and theological matter, and even more than that, with serious errors, that they
give offense to Catholic doctrine.
For this reason the most eminent and most reverend Fathers of the Supreme Sacred Con·
gregation .of the Holy Office exhort all the diocesan Bishops, as well as Superiors of Religious
Institutes, the Rectors of Seminaries and the Presidents of Universities that they effectively pro·
tect the minds of the young against the dangers in the writings of Father Teilhard de Chardin
and of his followers. Given in Rome ... on the 30th of June, 1962, Sebastian Masala, Notarius.
Fr. Philippe de la Trinite, who worked in the Holy Office as an adViser, was authorized to dispel
some falsely spread rumors about the Monitum. He wrote in his book Rome et Tei/hard de Chardin
( Librairie Artheme Fayard, Le Singe, Paris, 1964) p. 23, that the Holy Office is one of the three Congrega.
tions headed by the Holy Father himself. Pope John XXIII approved the Monitum on June 30, 1962, and
his Signature was not required to make the document valid.
2 "To avoid a fundamental dualism, at once impossible and anti scientific, and at the same time to safe·
guard the natural complexity of the stuff of the universe, I accordingly propose the following as a basis for
all that is to emerge later.
We shall assume that, essentially, all energy is physical in nature, but add that in each particular ele·
ment this fundamental energy is divided into two distinct components: a tangential energy which links the
element with all others of the same order . . . as itself in the universe; and a radial energy which draws it
towards ever greater complexity and centridty - in other words forwards." ( The Plwnomenon of Man, New
York, Harper Torchbooks, The Cloister Library, Harper & Row, 1961, pp. 64·65.)
3

Thomas Molnar, " To the Anthill With Love," National Review, December 1, 1964, pp. 1073·1074.

4

In Mind, January, 1961, pp. 99·106.

5

Dr. Paul Chauchard, Science and Religion, New York, 1962, p. 15.

6 To show how wrong are those who believe that Thomistic philosophy cannot be reconciled with the
contemporary idea of evolution, we wish to quote one of the most celebrated contemporary followers of
SI. Thomas, Professor Jacques Maritain in this point:
" In the second place comes the idea of evolution: evolution of the whole universe of matter,
and, in particular, evolution of living organisms. Like certain most general tenets of sdence,
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evolution is less a demonstrated con cl us ion than a kind of primary concept which has such
power in making phenomena decipherable that once expressed it becomes almost impossible for
the sCientific mind to do without it. Now if it is true that in opposition to the immobile archetypes and ever recurrent cycles of pagan antiquity, Christianity taught men to conceive history
both as irreversible and as running in a definite direction, then it may be said that by integrating in science the dimension of time and history, the idea of evolution has given to our
knowledge of nature a certain affinity with what the Christian view of things is on a quite different plane. In any case, the genesis of elements and the various phases of the history of the
heavens, and, in the realm of life, the historical development of an immense diversity of evolutive branches (' ph y I a'), all this, if it is understood in the proper philosophical perspective,
presupposes the transcendent God as the prime cause of evolution preserving in existence created
things and the impetus present in them, moving them from above so that superior forms may
emerge from inferior ones, and, when man is to appear at the peak of the series of vertabrates,
intervening in a special way and creating ex nihilo the spiritual and immortal soul of the first
man and of every indiVidual of the new species. Thus evolution correctly understood offers us
a spectacle whose greatness and universality make the activating omnipresence of God only
more tellingly sensed by our minds. " (J acques Maritain, On Ihe Use of Philosophy, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1961, pp. 69-70.)
Professor Maritain gives this theory of metaphysical reconciliation of hylomorphic metaphysics with
ti,e biological theory of evol ution:
Finally, as concerns evolution, I believe that the evolutive process of nature and the notion
of substantial form can and must be reconciled. Yet Doctor Sheldon put his finger on the crucial
point when he wrote: ' The diflkulty is to see how, if a substantial form is fixed and definite, it
can contain a principle that allows for its own transformation, not merely into another substantial form, but into a greater one.' This difficulty is a logical impossibility indeed; no substantial
form can be transformed into anotller; when a substantial change occurs, the new substantial
form is drawn out (' educed') from the potentiality of matter according to the ultimate root dispositions introduced in matter by the physical agents which modify atomic structure and cause
the transmutation of an element; or, in the case of compounds, by the activities of ti,e very substances which are in the process of 'corruption,' and which will cease to exist at the instant in
which the new substance comes into being . ..
"Now, when it comes to ti,e biological realm, a new problem arises; ti,e new living organism has of neceSSity the same specific substantial form as the organisms from which it proceeds. How , then, is biological evolution to be conceived in terms of substantial forms? I tllink
there are two possible ways of explaining it. First of all, species (the ontological, not the taxonomic species dealt with in botany, zoology or genetics) could be understood in a more dynamic as well as in a more extensive manner. When I say 'a more extensive manner,' I mean
that such large groups as those which classification terms families, orders, etc., should perhaps
be conSidered as belonging to one and the same ontological species. When I say ' a more dynamic matter,' I mean that the substantial form, in the realm of life, could be considered as
protruding, in its virtualities, beyond the capacities of the matter it informs in given cond itions,
like, for example, an architectural style or poetic idea which we might imagine as thrown into
matter and working it by itself. In short the substantial form would then be viewed as an ontological inlpulse realizing itself in various patterns along the line of a certain phylum. Yet such
evolution could , of course, only take place Within the limits of the phylum o r ti,e ontological
species in question.
"Secondly, concerning the hypothetical ongm of the various phylums themselves, if now
we take into account ti,e transcendent action of ti,e First Cause, we may obViously conceive
that ... that existence-giving influx of God, passing through created beings and using them as
instrumental causes, was able-and is still able-to heighten the vital energies which proceed
from the form in the organism it animates, so as to produce within matter, I mean witllin the
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genu cells, dispositions beyond the limits of that organism's specificity. As a result, at the moment of generation a new substantial form, specifically 'greater' or more elevated in being, would
be educed from the potentiality of matter thus more perfectly disposed ." (J acques Maritain,
The Range of Reason, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952, pp. 36, 37, 38.)
7 Pierre Teilhard de Chard in, The Phenomenon
218.

ofMar~

New York, Harper Torch books, 1961 , pp. 217-

8 On the dynamic nature of being, whether material or immaterial, as understood by St. Thomas Aquinas,
see the following comments by Etienne Gilson:
"The second mark of a living Thomism immediately follows from the first one because
in beings to be comes first, and to be is an act; the real world outside us is not made up of
static essenoes but of acting, operating and causing beings. In Thomas' own words, 'from the
very fact that something actually is, it is active:' ex hoc ipso quod aliquid in aetu es~ aelivum
esl. Without essenoes, finite beings would not be possible; and it is true that, as the Schoolmen
used to say, the essences are operating and living things, but they act and operate only because
they are, and they are only because each a nd every one of them is actuated by its own act of
being. It would be silly to attribute to Thomas Aquinas the great intuitions of today 's science.
He was not a Scientist, but at the level of philosophical inSight he certainly entertained a general
view of the world of nature attuned to that of modern phy sics. To him the last word about
physical reality was not extension in space, nor was it matter, nor pattern and shape, but rather
It was act, energeia, or as we say today, energy. He only would add to the scientifiC view of the
world a purely metaphysical one, to wit, that the act of all acts and the energy of all energies
is 'to be.' And indeed, if they were not, things could neither act nor operate; there Simply would
be nothing ... Now that is the authentic teaching of Thomas Aquinas: ule ultimate perfection
of the thing is its operation: operalio mim esl uUima perfeelio rei." (Etienne Gilson, nle Spiril
of Thomism, ew York, P. J. Kennedy and Sons, 1964, pp. 89, 90.)
St. Thomas' texts on the dynamiC nature of being can be also found in his Summa Contra Centiles,
I, 45, 6; I, 43, 1; II, 6, 7; III, 113, 2; Quesliones dispulalae, De Spirit. creatu ris, a. 11.
9

Claude Cuenot, Teilhard de

Chardir~

Helicon. Baltimore, 1965, p. 369.

10 Jacques Marltain, Bergsonian Philosophy and
175, 176, 177,230,23 1,3 18,319.

Th omisll~

New York, Philosophical Library, 1955, pp.

11 "Every truUI, even dealing with the most fleeting event, has something of the immutable (a butterfly
touches a rose and then flies away - at least it will remain eternally true that it touched the flower at that
given moment); and the truths which deal wiU, the inner necessities of essenoes are imm utable by their very
object To enjoy truth, without further ado, is Ule very life of the intellect qua intellect, and the aim of science qua scienoe as well as that of metaphYSical wisdom." (Jacques Maritain, op. cit., p. 39.)
12 Claude Cuwot, op . cit., p. 267.
13 Etienne Gilson, while discussing the nature of metaphysical knowledge as distinct from that of other
sciences, says:
" .. . all philosophical knowledge ultimately depends on metaphysics. Whether you say with
St. Thomas AqUinas, that metaphysics has for its own object ' being and its properties;' or with
Jonathan Edwards that it entails ' the consent of being to Being,' in both cases metaphysics remains the knowledge of the first principle, and of all the rest in the light of that principle. Thus
grounded on existence as on the most universal object of intellect, it is its permanent duty to
order and to regulate ever more complex problems of human conduct; it is its never-ended task
to keep the old scienoes in their natural limits, to assign their plaoes and their limits, to new
sciences; last, not least, to keep all human activities, however changing their circumstances, under the sway of the same reason by which alone man remains the judge of his own work and,
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after God, the master of his own destiny." (Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experi·
ence, New York, Charles Scribner 's Sons, 1937, pp. 308-310. )
14 Paul Chauchard, Man and Cosnzos . SCienlific Phenomenology in Teilhard de Chardin, New York, Herder
and Herder, 1965, p. 146.
15 Teilhard de Chardin, ne Phenomenon ofMan, op. cii., p. 47.
16 About the philosophical similarities and differences between Henri Bergson and P. Teilhard de Chardin,
see the most recently published work Bergson el Teilhard de Chardin, by Madeleine Barthelemy -Madaule,
Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1963. Also Teilhard 's references to Bergson in various places of his writings. As
to the relationship between Teilhard and Edouard Le Roy, see Claude Cuenot Pierre Teillzard de Chardi1;
op. cil, pp. 33,58-49.
Professor Le Roy, who died in 1954 and whose books were placed on the Index by the Church in
1931, has published some of the views he and Teilhard held, and, as it is becoming evident from the Teilhard works published after his death, it is certain that the influence of Teilhard upon Le Roy was strong.
The study of Le Roy's philosophical works is indispensable for the full and correct understanding of Teilhard 's ideas and for their application to various fields of knowledge.
17 " If our previous analyses are correct, they all point to the same conclusion, that metaphYSical adventures are doomed to fail when their authors substitute the fundamental concepts of any particular science for
those of metaphysics. Theology, logiC, physics, biology, psychology , sociology, economics, are fully competent to solve their own problems, however, and this must be our fourth conclusion: as metaphysics aims
at transcending all particular knowledge, no particular science is competent either to solve metaphYSical
problems, or to judge their metaphysical solutions." (Etienne Gilson, op. ci/., pp. 309-310.)
18 Paul Bernard Grenet, Pierre Teilhard de Chardi" ou Ie plzilosophe malgre lui, Beauchesne, PariS, 1960,
pp.5-7.
19 P. B. Medawar, op. ci/., p. 106.
20 Dr. Maurice Vernet, La grande itlusio" de TeiUulTll de Chardil; PariS, Gedalge, 1964, p. 9, 10.
21 Teilhard de Chardin, n e Phenomenon of Mat; op. ci/., pp. 293-294.
22 Loc. cit., pp. 296-297.
23 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Maktng of a Mind, New York, Harper and Row, 1965 , p. 302.
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